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Exports of non-fuel primary products 
Jere R. Behrman* 
Introduction 
The major macroeconomic goals of the Latin 
American countries relate to: (1) growth, (2) 
distribution, (3) short-run stability regarding 
employment, inflation and the balance-of-pay-
ments position, and (4) the international situa-
tion. Latin American analysts and policy-
makers have long been preoccupied about the 
impact on the attainment of these goals of 
fluctuations and trends in international non-
fuel primary commodity markets. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Latin Americans 
have given considerable (although not unani-
mous) support to the call for the revision of 
conditions in international non-fuel primary 
markets that is the foremost demand of the 
developing countries in their quest for a "New 
International Economic Order".1 
Although non-fuel primary products have 
accounted for a steadily declining share of total 
Latin American exports during the post-war 
era, they still represent a major source of 
*Chairman, Department of Economics, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
1
 For recent analyses of the New International Eco-
nomic Order see the references to this subject in: Bhagwati, 
Jagdish, N., éd., The New international Economic Order: 
The North-South Debate, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 1977; Cline, William R., éd., Proposals for a New 
International Economic Order: An Economic Analysis of 
Effects on Rich and Poor Countries, Washington, Praeger 
and Overseas Development Council, 1979; Erb, Guy F. 
and Bart S. Fisher, "U.S. Commodity Policy: What Re-
sponse to Third World Initiatives?", Law and Policy in 
International Business, Washington D.C., 9:2, pp. 479-
513,1977; Fishlow, Albert, etal., Rich and Poor Nations in 
the World Economy, New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1978; Grubel, Herbert G., "The Case Against 
the New International Economic Order", Weltwirts-
chaftliches Archiv, Tubingen 54:4, pp. 284-307, 1977; 
Kreinin, Mordechai E., and J. M. Finger, "A New Interna-
tional Economic Order: A Critical Survey of its Issues", 
Journal of World Trade Law, Twickenham, England, 
September/October 1976, and Vastine, Robert J., "United 
States International Commodity Policy" Law and Policy in 
International Business, 9:2, pp. 401-77,1977. 
foreign exchange for the region. In the first half 
of this decade, for example, they accounted for 
over 40% of total regional merchandise exports 
and over half of the individual country mer-
chandise exports for three-quarters of the 24 
countries that are included in table 1 (in 
descending order of dependence on such com-
modities for export revenues, these 18 coun-
tries are: Jamaica, Chile, Cuba, Honduras, 
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Guyana, 
Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, Colombia, Nicaragua, 
Uruguay, Brazil, Panama, El Salvador, Bolivia 
and Ecuador). Thus, both for the region as a 
whole and for many of the individual countries, 
non-fuel primary exports will continue to be 
important sources of foreign exchange during 
the 1980s whatever changes occur in the world 
economy. 
The framework for recent and ongoing 
exploration of changes in the international non-
fuel primary commodity markets was estab-
lished by the proposal and resolution adopted 
at UNCTAD IV (Nairobi, 1976).2 The original 
proposal focuses on 10 core commodities, five 
of which are important from the point of view of 
Latin America in the sense that they account 
for at least 1% of total regional merchandise 
export value (coffee, sugar, copper, cotton and 
cocoa), and one of which (tin) provides half of 
the merchandise export value of Bolivia. 
Together these six core commodities ac-
counted for 24% of Latin American merchan-
dise export earnings in the first half of the 
1970s. Eight other commodities also were 
mentioned, four of which (beef, iron ore, 
bananas, bauxite) each accounted for at least 
1% of the region's merchandise export earn-
ings, while the eight commodities together 
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD), "An Integrated Commodity Pro-
gramme", Geneva, 1976 and "Resolution Adopted by the 
Conference: Integrated Programme for Commodities", 
Geneva, TD/RES/93, (IV), 1976. 
Table 1 
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION O F MAIN NON-FUEL PRIMARY EXPORTS 
T O LATIN AMERICAN MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, 1970-1975a 
Country 
UNCTAD 
Core O t h e r s b 
O U O u 























































































































































































































































































































a F r o m Behrman, International Commodity Agreements;..., op. cit., except in the case of items forwhich notes c, d a n d fare relevant, which are from Lord, 
op. cit. 
" I n t he originai UNCTAD proposal soybeans and lumber were not included, but they are included with the other commodities in later documents. 
c
" Regionally significant" means commodities that accounted for at least 1% of Latin American merchandise exports in 1970-1974 (the period on which 
these columns are based). 
""Nat ional ly significant" means commodities that accounted for at least 10% of some Latin American country's merchandise export value for 1970-1974 
(the period on which these columns are based). 
e De f ine d as 100 times the variance from the trend for 1960-1976 relative to the arithmetic mean, where the dependent variable was first transformed by 
dividing the geometric mean of its series to make comparable linear and semi-iog functions. APaasche index is used for prices and a Laspeyres index is 
used lor quanti t ies. Based on coffee, sugar, copper, cotton, cocoa, beef, iron ore, bananas, bauxite, and soybeans. Source is Lord, op. cit. 
f1970-Í974. 
S N O data are given for Cuba in Lord, op. cit. 
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accounted for 10% of total Latin American 
merchandise export value. The emphasis in the 
proposal and resolution is on price stabilization 
for the core commodities through international 
buffer stock agreements, although there are 
also a number of phrases that suggest the 
possibility of increasing the secular trend of 
prices. 
T h e UNCTAD proposal is called an inte-
grated feature in it is the establishment of a 
Common Fund, primarily to provide financing 
for the core commodity agreements and sec-
ondarily to conduct "second window" lending 
operations for commodities not amenable to 
stockpiling, for product diversification, etc. 
The Common Fund would also pool and 
reduce risks, have more bargaining power in 
international capital markets than would a set 
of individual capital markets for the same 
commodities, and require smaller total finan-
cing than the aggregate of a set of individual 
funds because of differences of phasing of 
cycles across commodity markets. The original 
proposed magnitude of the Common Fund was 
U S $ 6 billion. 
Negotiations over the details of the Com-
mon Fund have continued for several years. 
T h e "Group of 77" developing countries 
sought a Fund with paid-up capital from direct 
assessments of about US$ 2 billion, to be 
supplemented by borrowing approximately 
US$ 4 billion on capital markets, and they 
advocated that about one-quarter of the total 
would be used for "second window" opera-
tions. The "Group B " or industrial countries, in 
contrast, advocated financing by deposits from 
the individual international commodity agree-
ments instead of direct assessments, and 
opposed "second window" operations. 
A breakthrough occurred at the March 
1979 UNCTAD negotiating session with the 
resolution of the two major controversial 
issues: (1) as regards the basic capital structure, 
agreement was reached that US$ 400 million 
would be raised by direct assessment (about 
two-thirds of which would be from Group B 
countries) and that other financing (amounting 
to one-third of the agreements' prospective 
financial requirements) would come from 
contributions by the producing and consuming 
country governments in each individual in-
ternational commodity agreement; (2) as 
regards the second window, it was agreed to 
establish such operations with funding of 
US$ 370 million, but without any transfers 
allowed from the first window (the United 
States maintained its opposition to partici-
pating in the second window, but no longer 
opposed the voluntary participation of other 
Group B countries). More than a hundred 
countries agreed in the plenary of the session 
to a document that resolved these issues and 
referred further negotiations and the drafting 
of the articles of the Common Fund to an 
Interim Committee. Although some difficult 
issues remain (e.g., the distribution of voting 
rights), Common Fund negotiations may well 
be successfully concluded within a year or so. 
Subsequently, ratification by national legisla-
tures will be required. 
Consideration of the UNCTAD Integrated 
Commodity Programme has dominated recent 
discussions of future changes in international 
non-fuel primary commodity markets. More-
over, after the March 1979 UNCTAD nego-
tiating session there appears to be a significant 
probability that some variant of the UNCTAD 
programme will be implemented. Therefore 
the rest of this paper focuses on the implica-
tions of the UNCTAD proposal for Latin Ame-
rica. Section I explores the primary question 
of "first window" price stabilization of the core 
commodities, section II more briefly considers 
the implications of attempting to alter the 
secular price trends, and section III summa-
rizes the results. 
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I 
Non-fuel primary commodity price stabilization 
The UNCTAD Programme emphasized the 
stabilization of prices of the core commodities 
through international buffer stock operations. 
In order of the commodities' importance in 
export earnings for Latin America, the average 
annual absolute value percentage deviations 
from the trends of these prices over the period 
1963-1972 were 17 for coffee, 33 for sugar, 22 
for copper, 8 for cotton, 23 for cocoa and 8 for 
tin.3 For all but cotton and tin these fluctuations 
were relatively large. The specific implications 
of these price fluctuations for each country, of 
course, depend on the exact composition of its 
exports. The price instability indices in column 
20 of table 1 suggest that among Latin Ameri-
can countries in recent decades Jamaica, Peru, 
Paraguay, Barbados and Bolivia have experi-
enced particularly large fluctuations in the 
prices of their commodity exports included in 
the UNCTAD programme. Such large varia-
tions in prices may make private or public 
planning much more difficult. They may also 
contribute to fluctuations in earnings if they are 
not offset by changes in volume of production. 
Because of differential variations in such 
volume, however, the Latin American coun-
tries with the greatest instability in export 
earnings from these same commodities differ 
somewhat from the above list, their order being 
Argentina, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Barbados, 
and Venezuela (column 22 of table 1). Formany 
purposes the effect of such fluctuations in 
earnings may be more important than that of 
price fluctuations, although it is the latter 
towards which the UNCTAD programme is 
directed (this topic will be dealt with again 
below). 
A number of questions arise about the 
UNCTAD programme. What are the magni-
3Behrman, Jere R., International Commodity Agree-
ments: An Evaluation of the UNCTAD Integrated Com-
modity Programme. Washington: Overseas Development 
Council, 1977. 
tudes that are involved in its operation? What 
are the implications for developing countries in 
general and for Latin America in particular? 
What are the implications for the developed 
economies ? How does this programme 
compare with alternative policies? 
These questions will be explored in this 
section primarily through the use of simula-
tions of international buffer stock activities 
with simple econometric models of the 
relevant international markets. These models 
capture the time pattern of simultaneous and 
lagged responses in supply, current demand 
and private inventory demand relations for 
each of the relevant commodity markets, and 
the parameters used in them are those most 
consistent with observed behavioural and 
technological responses.4 Before turning to the 
insights gained from these simulations, 
however, it is useful to indicate some reasons 
why the simple a priori theorizing and simple 
correlations that are often used for such analy-
sis may be inadequate. 
1. Limitations of a priori and correlation 
analysis of commodity markets. 
Much of the analysis of international com-
modity markets is based on simple supply and 
4For further details concerning these models and their 
use for commodity market simulations, see Behnnan, In-
ternational Commodity Agreements:... op. cit.; Behrman, 
"The UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Program: An 
Evaluation", in F.G. Adams and S. Klein, eds., Stabilizing 
World Commodity Markets: Analysis, Practice and Policy, 
Lexington, Mass.: Heath-Lexington Publishing Company, 
1978; Jere R. Behrman, and Pranee Tinakorn, "Evaluating 
Integrated Schemes for Commodity Market Stabilization" 
in F. Gerard Adams and Jere R. Behrman, eds., Econometric 
Modeling of World Commodity Policy, Lexington, Mass.: 
Heath-Lexington Publishing Company, 1978, and "The 
UNCTAD Integrated Program: Earnings Stabilization 
Through Buffer Stocks for Latin America's Commodities", 
in W. Labys, M. Ishaq Nadiri, and José Núñez del Arco, 
eds., Commodity Markets and Latin American Develop-
ment: A Modeling Approach, Cambridge: Ballinger 
Publishing Company and NBER, 1979. 
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demand models or bivariate correlations. 
However, such analysis may be quite mis-
leading in respects that frequently do not seem 
to be recognized. For this reason, simulations 
of macroeconometric models will be used in 
the analysis below. 
One problem with many of the analyses is 
that the results are sensitive to the assumed 
forms of the supply and demand functions. For 
example, Johnson5 argues that "elementary 
economics" demonstrates the incompetence of 
UNCTAD economists, since they did not 
recognize the trade-off between prices and 
earnings stabilization, yet Johnson's own 
analysis of this trade-off depends upon his par-
ticular assumptions of linear price-elasticity 
curves and additive shifts, without any em-
pirical testing. With alternative assumptions 
—some of which seem theoretically and em-
pirically at least as warranted as his— very dif-
ferent results are obtained!6 
Another example is provided by Lord's7 
recent empirical analysis of the supply versus 
demand causes of fluctuations in Latin Ameri-
can commodity exports. By looking at the sign 
of the correlation between retrended quantities 
and prices, he claims to identify whether the 
underlying shifts were primarily in supply 
(negative correlations) or in demand (positive 
correlations).8 But Porter9 proves that such a 
test is valid only if the supply and demand price 
elasticities are equal,10 and it seems very 
5 Harry G. Johnson, "Commodities: Less Developed 
Countr ies ' Demands and Developed Countries' Res-
ponse" , in Bhagwati, op. cit. 
' 'See Berhman, International Commodity Agree-
ments:..., op. cit. 
7Montague, J. Lord, "The UNCTAD Integrated Pro-
gram: Export Stabilization and Economic Growth in Latin 
America", in Labys, Nadiri and Núñez, op. cit. 
8 T h e r e is a long tradition of making some inferences by 
this method dating back at least to United Nations, 
Instability in Export Markets of Under-Developed Coun-
tries, ST/ECA/15, 1952. Another, more recent, example is 
Ezriel M. Brook, Enzo R. Grilli and Jean Wallbroeck, 
"Commodity Price Stabilization and the Developing 
World", Washington: IBRD, Bank Staff Working Paper 
No. 262, 1977. 
9Richard Porter, "On Placing the Hlame for Primary 
Product Instability", International Economic Review, 
Philadelphia, Pa., 11:1, pp. 175-178, 1970. 
1(JTo see that elasticities must matter, consider the case 
in which one of the two curves is stabile and infinitely 
unlikely that such elasticities are anywhere 
near equal for most of the country-commodity 
combinations that Lord considers. The market 
shares of Latin American countries for the six 
UNCTAD core commodities of interest to them 
are generally relatively small, the only values 
higher than 10% being for Bolivia (tin), Brazil 
(coffee and cocoa), Chile (copper) and Colom-
bia (coffee). Thus, the demand price elasticities 
facing the individual countries are very high, 
often approaching infinity, but Lord's analysis 
is appropriate only if the country supply elas-
ticities are equally high: an assumption that 
does not seem to be based on empirical facts. 
Therefore, once again his conclusions seem to 
be quite suspect because they are not based on 
relevant assumptions regarding the underlying 
structure (in this case the elasticities) of the 
markets.11 
Yet another problem affecting much of the 
simple theoretical and empirical analysis is 
that all adjustments are assumed to be instanta-
neous, so that fairly long-run price equilibria 
are reached immediately. Both Johnson and 
Lord are among the multitude of analysts who 
make this simplifying assumption. In the real 
world, however, there are considerable lags 
because of the time required for adjustment of 
production, consumption and investment 
processes and for the creation of expectations, 
and such lags may substantially alter the out-
comes compared with those implied by ana-
lyses that ignore such factors, as the textbook 
"explosive cobweb" model demonstrates. 
The models used for the simulations 
reported below differ from the Johnson-Lord 
type of analysis in that decisions regarding a 
number of critical questions (e.g., magnitude of 
elasticities, additive versus multiplicative 
elastic (thereby fixing the equilibrium price) and the other 
curve has less than infinite elasticity and shifts consid-
erably. Even though by assumption the instability arises 
from the movements in the latter curve, the Lord method 
will give a zero correlation between pairs and quantities 
and atribute the instability equally to shifts in both curves. 
^ I f demand elasticities are bigger than the supply 
elasticities, as is probably generally the case for the 
country-commodity combinations that Lord considers, 
then this method is biased towards incorrectly attributing 
the relative responsibility for shifts to the supply side, See 
Porter, op. cit., for an explicit demonstration of this bias. 
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shifts, pattern of lags) were made in order to 
ensure the highest consistency possible with 
the historical data from these markets. It is true 
that the use of these models still involves a 
number of important assumptions,12 but they 
provide a much better basis for this analysis 
than the frequently encountered studies 
involving much stronger critical assumptions, 
of the types noted above. 
2. Magnitudes involved in buffer 
stock operations. 
The UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Pro-
gramme has been simulated over a thirteen-
year period under the assumption that the 
buffer stock operators have sufficient financial 
and commodity reserves to keep price fluctua-
tions within 15% of the secular trends that 
actually prevailed in the 1950-1975 period (see 
discussion at start of section II below). The 
simulation was conducted over a relatively 
long period so that the ongoing behaviour of 
the agreement can be considered under a 
variety of external conditions regarding world 
economic activity, etc. 
Table 2 summarizes the simulated activity 
of the buffer stocks and the impact of this 
activity on producers ' revenues over the thir-
teen-year period.13 For each of the six com-
modities of interest to Latin America it gives 
the number of buffer stock purchases and sales; 
the longest continuous period of buffer stock 
activity without buying and without selling; 
the present discounted value of buffer stock 
activity with and without inclusion of the value 
of final stocks; the mean percentage changes 
due to the buffer stock price stabilization 
programme in prices, quantities supplied and 
producers ' revenues; the present discounted 
1 2See Behrman, International Commodity Agree-
ments:..., op. cit., and "The UNCTAD Integrated Com-
modity program...", op. cit., and Behrman and Tinakorn, 
"Evaluat ing Integrated Schemes...", op. cit., for further 
discussion of this question. 
*
3For much more detailed discussion of these results 
see Behrman, International Commodity Agreements:..., 
op. cit., and "The UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Pro-
gram...", op. cit., and Behrman and Tinakorn, "Evaluating 
Integrated Schemes...", op. cit., and "The UNCTAD In-
tegrated Program...", op. cit. 
value of additional producers' revenues due to 
the institution of the Integrated Commodity 
Programme; and an index of the extent of 
revenue stabilization which occurs because of 
the Programme.14 
The simulations indicate that for three of 
the six core commodities of interest to the 
region the buffer stock must begin with initial 
stocks in order always to be able to defend the 
price ceiling. If there were not such initial 
stocks for sugar, copper and tin, the buffer stock 
authorities would not always be able to defend 
the ceilings in the initial years because to do so 
would require greater quantities of commodi-
ties than they would have purchased at an 
earlier time in efforts to defend the floors. 
After establishing their initial position, in 
the subsequent thirteen years of simulated 
buffer stock operation the buffer stocks in-
tervene in the market 42 out of 78 possible 
times, or slightly more than half of the years, on 
average, for each commodity (columns 1 and 2 
of table 2). Such activity is somewhat more 
frequent for sugar and somewhat less frequent 
for tin than for the other four commodities. 
Despite this frequency of intervention in the 
market, there would be long periods when the 
buffer stocks would not intervene on one side 
of the market. Columns 3 and 4 of table 2 show 
the longest continuous period in years of buffer 
stock activity without buying or without 
selling, respectively. The longest period 
without buying ranges from three years for 
cocoa to thirteen years for cotton and tin, with 
an average of 9.7 years, while the longest 
period without selling ranges from two years 
for sugar to ten years for tin, with an average 
of 5.3 years. These long periods without inter-
vening on one side of the market suggest that 
it might be quite difficult to be sure that the 
target prices around which the buffer stocks are 
attempting to stabilize are related to long-run 
equilibrium values. These long periods also 
imply that if international commodity agree-
1 4This index is the ratio of the standard deviation oí 
real revenues with the price stabilization programme to the 
standard deviation of real revenues without the stabiliza-
tion programme. A value of less than 1 thus indicates that 
revenues are more stable with the programme than without 
it. 
Table 2 
SUMMARY O F BASIC INTERNATIONAL BUFFER STOCK COMMODITY PROGRAMME SIMULATIONS FOR SIX UNCTAD C O R E 
C O M M O D I T I E S OF IMPORTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA, OVER 13 YEARS 
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"Including initial purchases in the case of sugar, copper and tin. 
These values are present discounted values using a 5% real discount rate and are in millions of constant 1975 dollars. 
T h e comparisons are with identical simulations, except that no buffer stock activity is assumed. 
d Thi s is the ratio of the standard deviation in real revenues with price stabilization to that without price stabilization. 
e T h e present discounted value is negative even though the mean percentage change in producers ' revenues is positive, because of negative values 
early in the simulation period. 
fTotal for columns 5, 6 and 10. 
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ments are in effect only for the five-year period 
suggested by the Havana Charter, in many 
cases activity might be quite concentrated on 
one side of the market. Such considerations 
suggest that it might be desirable to have buffer 
stock agreements with longer lives than has 
generally been proposed. 
Another interesting aspect of the simu-
lated buffer stock interventions is that pur-
chases are more than twice as frequent as are 
sales for the six commodities combined. The 
prevalence of purchases for cocoa, sugar and 
cotton much more than offsets the weight of 
sales for coffee and copper (columns 1 and 2 of 
table 2), and this overall asymmetry between 
purchases and sales occurs despite the fact that 
the buffer stocks are stabilizing around the 
long-run secular trends that actually occurred. 
The frequency of intervention on one side or 
the other of the market is not a very good 
indication of whether or not the target secular 
price trend is above or below the long-run 
equilibrium path, except possibly in extreme 
cases or with a very large number of years of 
operation. 
Another important point about the simu-
lated operation of these buffer stocks is that the 
magnitude of financing becomes fairly large 
after several years, even though there are 
significant advantages from pooling finances 
across these six core commodities. For exam-
ple, the sum of purchases minus sales indica-
tes that, on the average, a total of about US$ 1 
billion per year would be expended. For half of 
the commodities, moreover, the maximum 
financing needs would occur in the first five 
years of operation. Therefore, in about six years 
the buffer stocks would exhaust the US$ 6 
billion fund originally mentioned in the 
UNCTAD proposal, even if only these six of the 
ten core commodities were included and even 
if no second window operations were con-
ducted. This occurs despite the gain of about 
21% obtained by pooling across commodities 
so that sales of one commodity offset purchases 
of other commodities.15 The large access to 
1 5This calculation of the gains from pooling depends 
upon the assumption that capital markets are not perfect 
and that individual countries participating in the interna-
tional commodity agreements could not do such pooling on 
financing required despite such pooling may 
make it necessary —at least politically— to 
establish such a programme initially on a 
shorter-term basis than the considerations in 
the previous paragraph would indicate are 
desirable. However, one important caveat 
should be made here. The model for sugar 
seems much less satisfactory than those for the 
other commodities,16 and sugar plays a very big 
role in these estimates. If sugar is excluded the 
average required access to funding drops 70% 
to less than US$ 350 million per year, with a 
43% gain from pooling. This level of financing 
would be possible for a number of years with 
funding of the order of magnitude proposed by 
UNCTAD, even if allowance is made for the 
four core commodities not of particular interest 
to Latin America and for some second window 
operations. 
What are the net cost of this buffer stock 
activity after adjustments for storage, transac-
tions, deterioration, interest, and buying-
selling differentials? The answer depends 
largely on the value placed on the final stocks 
and on whether or not the simulations for sugar 
are reliable. For all six core commodities the 
present discounted value of operating the 
UNCTAD programme for 13 years is —7.0 
billion 1975 dollars if final stocks are valued at 
actual prices prevailing the year after the 
simulations, and —19.3 billion 1975 dollars if 
final stocks are valued at zero (columns 5 and 6 
of table 2). The most realistic estimate presum-
ably is somewhere between these two num-
bers, since if all of the stocks were sold after the 
last year of the simulation, prices would fall 
considerably, but not to zero. If sugar is 
excluded the two analogous values are —0.7 
and-5.4 billion 1975 dollars. The range is still 
negative and may imply fairly large costs, but is 
of the order of magnitude that has been dis-
cussed in the UNCTAD negotiations (and the 
upper limit of this range increases only to —0.9 
their own. See Behrman, Jere R. and Pranee Tinakorn, 
"The Simulated Potential Gains of Pooling International 
Buffer Stock Financing Across the UNCTAD Core Com-
modities", Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 
Report for the U.S. Treasury, 1977, for further discussion of 
these issues. 
i e S e e Behrman and Tinakorn. "Evaluating Integrated 
Schemes..", op. cit. 
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billion 1975 dollars if the other four core 
commodities are added). 
Where do such considerations about the 
simulated operation of the UNCTAD Inte-
grated Commodity Programme leave us? They 
suggest some reservations. There would be 
start-up problems in about half of the agree-
ments in that the price ceilings could not be 
defended due to inadequate prior purchases, 
and such events would strain the patience of 
consuming participants. It would be difficult to 
know whether or not the target price paths 
were close to the long-run equilibrium paths 
from the frequency or pattern of market inter-
ventions by the buffer stocks. Even if the target 
price paths were identical with the long-run 
equilibrium price paths, moreover, consider-
able finances might be involved. If the target 
price paths exceed the equilibrium price paths 
by much, furthermore, the required financing 
could become enormous (see section 3 below). 
At the cost of reducing the price stability 
around the long-run trends, however, the target 
price paths could be adjusted in line with 
buffer stock accumulations to ensure that 
financial requirements did not explode.17 
On the other hand, the simulations suggest 
that price stabilization for the core commodi-
ties of interest to Latin America (or for all the 
core commodities) is feasible over a number of 
years with total financing not too much greater 
than the amounts mentioned in the negotia-
tions. If the estimates for sugar are misleading 
because of inadequacies in the underlying 
model, if sugar were excluded, or if a flexible 
target price path reduced the financial require-
ments for sugar, the order of magnitude of the 
financing required would be within the limits 
discussed at the negotiating sessions. 
But these comments refer only to the 
feasibility and direct costs of operating the 
UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Programme. 
The benefits and costs from the point of view of 
the developing and developed countries must 
now be considered. 
17See Behrman and Tinakorn, "Evaluating Integrated 
Schemes...", op. cit. The simulations there suggest that the 
use oí variable target price paths {or variable price bands) 
adjusted for actual stock accumulations can substantially 
reduce the financial costs. 
3. Implications of the UNCTAD Programme 
for developing countries in general and for 
those in Latin America in particular 
The six core commodities of interest to Latin 
America are produced and exported primarily 
by developing countries. At the start of this 
decade such countries accounted for virtually 
all of the world production and exports of coffee 
and cocoa, almost a third of production and over 
two-thirds of exports of" sugar, about 40% of 
production and 54% of exports of copper, about 
a third of production and almost two-thirds of 
exports of cotton, and about three-quarters of 
production and a slightly higher proportion of 
exports of tin. The developing countries as a 
group import and consume a significant, al-
though much smaller, proportion of these 
goods. Thus, at the start of the decade they 
accounted for 12 to 20% of world imports of 
sugar, cotton and tin, although only 4 to 6% of 
world imports of coffee, cocoa, and copper. The 
producer-exporter role is stressed here because 
that is the more important one in the aggregate, 
but the reader should keep in mind that for a 
few developing countries the consumer-im-
porter role is significant, particularly for sugar, 
cotton and tin. 
Of course for developing country produc-
ers and consumers (as well as for both groups 
elsewhere) there are some potential gains from 
the price stabilization itself to the extent that 
risks are diminished or costs related to price 
fluctuations in production or in use are ad-
justed. Such gains have the interesting feature 
of being shared across the market. For example, 
if they exist on the production side, price 
stabilization is likely to lead to increased 
supplies from which users will benefit, while if 
they exist on the users' side, price stabilization 
is likely to lead to increased demand from 
which suppliers will benefit. Unfortunately, 
empirical estimates of the magnitude of such 
gains are not available, but they should not be 
ignored, since some analysts argue that they 
may be substantial. 
Now let us consider the impact on produc-
ers' revenues of the operation of the buffer 
stock programmes. It is useful to break down 
revenue between the quantities supplied and 
the price received. 
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As regards the quantity supplied, the sim-
ulations indicate initial periods of no response 
for cocoa, coffee and copper. These initial 
periods of four or five years of no supply 
response reflect the relatively long lead times 
required to bring newly-planted trees or ex-
panded mine capacity into operation. Subse-
quently, however, fairly large supply respon-
ses are induced, at least for the agricultural 
products, with increases of over 11% for cocoa 
and sugar, over 6% for cotton, and over 3% for 
coffee. Changes of these magnitudes imply that 
it may be quite misleading to consider the 
impact of international commodity agreements 
within a framework which assumes no supply 
responses. In fact, in some respects the exis-
tence of supply responses with long lags may 
make stabilization more difficult. For example, 
the simulation for cocoa indicates a fairly large 
supply increase eight to ten years after the 
beginning of the programme in response to the 
much higher price received for cocoa because 
of the simulated buffer stock programme in the 
third and fourth year, not in response to the 
simulated current market conditions. 
Except in the case of tin, the simulated 
buffer stock programme has much larger per-
centage effects on prices than on quantities 
supplied.18 For the other five core commodities 
of interest, in almost every year the price is 
affected either upwards or downwards. The 
price is changed in many years in which no 
buffer stock activity occurs because of" the 
dynamic impact of past buffer stock purchases 
or sales. Under the particular assumptions of 
these simulations, the average price increase is 
23.1% for sugar (see column 9 of table 2).19 For 
cocoa and cotton the average annual increases 
are respectively 4.2% and 3.7%. For coffee the 
increase is 1.5%, while for the two minerals it is 
less than 1% in absolute value. It is interesting 
to note, however, that in every case except tin 
18Tin may be an exception because the International 
Tin Agreement and United States Government tin stock-
pile activities apparently kept prices fairly stabile during 
the sample period. See Smith, Gordon W. and George R. 
Schink, "The International Tin Agreement: A reassess-
ment", The Economic Journal, New York, No. 86, pp. 715-
28,1976. 
19But it should be remembered that there is some 
question about die sugar model. 
the price stabilization programme leads in 
some years to prices higher than would other-
wise exist, while in other years it leads to prices 
lower than those which would prevail without 
it. 
Altered dynamic price paths induce changes 
both in supply, as noted above, and in demand, 
and the combination of the impact on prices 
and on quantities results in changes in produc-
ers' revenues. In some cases, the movements in 
prices and quantities reinforce each other, 
while in other cases they are opposing. The to-
tal effects are fairly significant revenue gains 
for agricultural commodities and much smaller 
revenue losses for the two minerals (columns 9 
and 10 of table 2). For sugar the estimated an-
nual average revenue gain is 23.6%, which im-
plies a present discounted value of additional 
producers' revenues of over US$ 10 billion. For 
the other three agricultural commodities the 
average annual percentage revenue gains 
range from 2.4 for coffee to 6.7 for cocoa. The to-
tal 6.1% average annual revenue gain for cot-
ton, however, implies a present discounted 
value of total producers' revenue gains of the 
order of US$ 8 billion over the simulation peri-
od. Across all six commodities, the total simu-
lated present discounted value of additional 
producers' revenues is somewhat over US$ 20 
billion. This gain is fairly substantial, with 
most of it accruing to sugar and cotton produc-
cers and, to a lesser extent, to coffee pro-
ducers. 
On the other hand, there are simulated 
small losses for the two mineral products. Of 
course, these results are conditional on the 
particular assumptions underlying these simu-
lations, and they might change with different 
assumptions, but it well might be the case that 
under any set of assumptions for a particular 
time period there would be some losers among 
the producers (such as the minerals in this case) 
as well as some gainers. This possibility may 
make it quite difficult to hold together an 
integrated arrangement. 
These comments refer to what happens to 
the level of revenues. But some critics of the 
UNCTAD programme have claimed that under 
reasonable assumptions increases in revenues 
will be accompanied by decreases in their 
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stability. For example, Johnson20 makes this 
argument. However, as indicated above, the 
question of whether or not there is a trade-off 
between the level and the stability of revenues 
cannot be settled a prion. It depends upon the 
elasticities of the underlying curves and the 
natures of shifts in those curves, and is thus 
basically an empirical issue. The results in the 
last column of table 2 indicate that only for 
copper is there evidence of a trade-off between 
the stability and the level of revenues. In 
thecase of copper, the price stabilization pro-
gramme stabilizes revenues slightly, but with 
the result of a somewhat lower present dis-
counted value. For the four agricultural com-
modities, revenues are increased fairly sub-
stantially, while revenue instabilities are re-
^Johnson, op. cit. 
duced significantly. For tin there is a slight re-
duction in revenues with almost no change in 
stability. At least for the agricultural commodi-
ties, then, Johnson's strong warning about the 
trade-off between the level and stability of rev-
enues does not seem warranted. 
Up to this point, the simulated impact of 
the UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Pro-
gramme on the revenues of all producers has 
been discussed. Now, let us turn to its effect on 
the Latin American producers. Table 3 gives 
the present discounted values of real revenue 
changes which would accrue to each of the 
major Latin American producing countries in 
respect of each of the six UNCTAD core 
commodities, the total present discounted 
additional value for each major Latin American 
producing country, and the ratio of that total 
value to the average export value over the 
period 1970-1975. 
Table 3 
PRESENTE DISCOUNTED VALUES OF GAINS ACCRUING TO LATIN AMERICAN PRODUCERS FROM 
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aCalculated by distributing the simulated present discounted values of additional revenues to producers in column 10 of 
table 2 by each Latin American country's share in world production. For the last column the total export values are from 
United Nations figures (1976), with the OECD deflator used to convert into millions of 1975 dollars. 
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The present discounted values of gains to 
producers in an individual country depend 
upon the total present discounted value of 
additional producer revenues (column 10 of 
table 2) and the country's share in world 
supply. These simulated gains are gross gains 
that do not include any contributions to the 
financing of the buffer stock operations (co-
lumns 4 and 5 of table 2). If the producing 
countries contributed half of the net cost of 
buffer stock operations the aggregate producer 
net gains would be from 17 to 46% lower, 
depending on the evaluation of final buffer 
stocks held at the end of 1975. In order not to 
become too complex because of alternative 
schemes for distributing the net costs of buffer 
stock operations among producers and con-
sumers and the question of how to value the 
final stocks, the present analysis is focussed on 
gross producer gains without subtracting their 
contributions to the buffer stock operations. 
The present discounted value of gains net of 
contributions to the costs of buffer stock opera-
tions would of course be lower than this, with 
the amount of the reduction depending on the 
exact assumptions about the funding arrange-
ments and the evaluation of final stocks. 
The largest simulated gainers in absolute 
terms are the sugar and cotton producers 
(because of the large simulated overall gains for 
those producers in table 2) and the coffee 
producers (because of the moderate overall 
simulated gain in table 2 and the large Latin 
American share in world production). The 
gains for the other three commodities are much 
smaller, and they are actually negative for the 
two minerals. 
In absolute terms, then, the big simulated 
gainers among Latin American countries in-
clude Brazil (1,507 million 1965 dollars), Cuba 
(849 million), Mexico (741 million), the Domi-
nican Republic (431 million), Colombia (328 
million), Peru (286 million) and Jamaica (106 
million). Smaller gainers include Argentina 
and the Central American countries. Bolivia 
and Chile are small losers. The total present 
discounted value of these revenue gains to 
Latin American producers is about 4.5 billion 
1975 dollars. 
To put these amounts in perspective, it is 
useful to consider them as percentages of the 
average annual value of exports in 1970-1975 
(the last column in table 3). In these terms, they 
range from —2% to +97%. The big relative 
gainers are the Dominican Republic, with 
almost a year's export value (97%), and Cuba, 
with over a half a year (55%). Mexico, Colom-
bia, Brazil, El Salvador, Peru and Jamaica all 
gain from one-fifth to one-third of a year's 
export value. For Latin America as a whole the 
estimate is a gain of about one-sixth (16%) of an 
average year's export value. 
Are such gains for Latin America small or 
large? The answer depends upon the point of 
comparison. A total of 4.5 billion 1975 dollars is 
not so small as to be irrelevant. On the other 
hand, to obtain it requires operation of the 
buffer stock programme for a fairly long period 
of time. It is small, moreover, in comparison to 
the transfers of roughly US$ 65 billion per year 
brought about by the OPEC petroleum price 
increases, and furthermore, some of the poorer 
Latin American countries (e.g., Bolivia and 
Paraguay) would not benefit from such a pro-
gramme. 
Finally, let us return to the macroeconomic 
goals of the Latin American economies that are 
listed in the first paragraph of this paper. What 
are the implications of the simulations for the 
attainment of these goals? To consider this 
question it is useful to separate the impact of 
increased levels of earnings from that due to 
the reduction of fluctuations. 
The impact of increasing the levels of 
earnings is almost certainly positive in regard 
to many of the macroeconomic goals. More-
over, in economies in which foreign exchange 
availability is an important constraint or in 
which unutilized capacity exists, the indirect 
effects transmitted through government expen-
diture, the money supply, import availabilities 
and the signalling functions of the commodity-
producing sector may be much more important 
than the direct effects. The author is also en-
gaged in an extensive project to evaluate the in-
teractions between world commodity markets 
and goal attainment in developing countries, 
with case examples including coffee and cop-
per in Brazil, Central America and Chile,21 and 
the tentative results of this project suggest that 
21Some preliminary results are given in F. G. Adams, 
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the impact of increased primary commodity 
export earnings, as magnified by the indirect 
channels noted above, may be quite consid-
erable: 
(1) The growth impact is likely to be 
positive in the commodity-producing sector 
and in the economy as a whole due to relaxation 
of the foreign exchange constraint, increased 
savings and investment, and fuller capacity 
utilization. 
(2) The distributional effects may be re-
gressive because the direct beneficiaries (e.g., 
the owners of factors used in the sector of 
commodity production) and those who benefit 
from the wage signalling effect (e.g., those in 
organized or government sectors) are likely to 
be in the middle or upper parts of the income 
distribution scale. The impact of induced infla-
tion on distribution is likely to reinforce this 
tendency. Offsetting considerations are the 
progressive impact of increased employment 
(or employment in the modern sector) and of 
some induced increased government expendi-
tures on human capital, housing, and welfare. 
Whether the regressive or progressive tenden-
cies dominate depends upon the exact struc-
ture existing in a particular country and the 
weight put on various parts of the income 
distribution scale, but the often substantial 
overall employment effects may make the net 
impact progressive in many cases. 
(3) The short-run stability effects may be 
quite substantial because of the magnification 
through the indirect channels and the consider-
able time period required for adjustments to 
long-run equilibria. As noted above, overall 
employment and capacity utilization increases 
are likely to be large. Although additional 
imports will be induced with part of the extra 
foreign exchange, not all of it will be so used, so 
the balance of current international payments 
generally improves. Given the passive nature 
of most monetary systems in Latin America, the 
raised level of foreign exchange reserves, fur-
Jere R. Behrman and R. Roldan. "Measuring the Impact of 
Primary Commodity Fluctuations on Economic Develop-
ment: Coffee and Brazil", American Economic Review, 
Nashville, Tenn. , pp. 164-169, May 1979. The final results 
will be forthcoming in a series of books written or edited by 
Adams and myself. 
ther augmented by reduced government defi-
cits (due to increased tax revenues from the 
commodity sector and the rest of the economy) 
will cause an expansion in the money supply. 
Only part of the larger money supply will be 
absorbed by greater economic activity, so 
prices will also rise. 
(4) The international position of the econo-
my will almost certainly be improved by the 
additional foreign exchange and the lessening 
of the foreign exchange constraint. In many 
cases positive capital inflows may be induced 
by expectations of ongoing greater economic 
activity. The only offsetting consideration 
might be greater dependence on the interna-
tional system if this situation could not be 
reversed easily, but at least in principle 
policies could be directed towards keeping 
such risks minimal. 
The impact of increased export earnings 
from primary commodities on goal attainment 
in Latin American economies is therefore 
relatively straightforward, fairly considerable, 
and likely to be mostly positive. The effects of 
reduced fluctuations in primary commodity 
prices or in related export earnings, however, 
are much more ambiguous, and the large but 
unsatisfactory literature on this subject finds 
conflicting results.22 The ongoing study on 
integrated commodity and developing country 
models to which reference was made above 
provides the best tool available to date to 
explore such effects.23 These models incorpo-
rate lagged responses, permanent versus tran-
sitory responses, and non-linearities (but, as 
noted above, not direct responses to variances) 
that might result in principle from different 
degrees of fluctuations. The experiments 
conducted to date, however, underline the lack 
of empirical support for the widely suggested 
2 2Lord and Manger review this literature and note that 
most of it depends upon extraordinary assumptions about 
the similarity of adjustment structures and the degree of 
exchange rate disequilibrium across the countries. See 
Lord, op. cit., and Manger, John, "A Review of the 
Literature on Causes, Effects and Other Aspects of Export 
Instability", Philadelphia: WEFA (mimeo), 1979. 
^ E a r l i e r macro studies have focussed on only one 
country or have used questionable model specifications 
(e.g., demand-determined Keynesian models without 
supply iactors.) 
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hypothetical effects of fluctuations in interna-
tional markets on goal attainment in Latin 
American economies. Depending on the struc-
ture of the individual economies, reduction of 
such variations may or may not aid in the 
pursuit of each of the four macroeconomic goals 
that are discussed above. The study in ques-
tion, however, indicates that the total impact 
generally is not large. 
4. Implications of the UNCTAD Programme 
for developed countries 
The developed countries as a group are pri-
marily importers and consumers of the six core 
commodities of interest to Latin America. At 
the start of this decade they accounted for the 
following percentages of world imports: coffee 
(90), copper (87), tin (81), cocoa (78), sugar (65) 
and cotton (51). They enter into the production 
and exporting side to a smaller extent, but still 
accounted for over 40% of world copper pro-
duction and exports, over 20% of world sugar 
and cotton production and exports, and 16% of 
world tin exports.24 The followings paragraphs, 
however, are focussed on the impact of the 
Programme on the developed countries in their 
primary role as importers and consumers of the 
UNCTAD core commodities. To the extent 
that they play a secondary role as producers 
and exporters, of course, the effects are similar 
to those emphasized above for the developing 
countries. 
Once again, stabilization of the individual 
commodity prices may in itself have a positive 
effect on consumers and producers for the same 
reasons discussed above for the developing 
countries. Likewise, such effects are likely to 
be transferred across markets to the other 
participants, although the empirical magnitu-
des are not known. 
The mayor direct costs of obtaining more 
stabile prices and other possible benefits noted 
below are the generally higher prices for the 
relevant commodities (column 7 of table 2) and 
the developed countries' share of running the 
UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Programme. 
^See Behrman, Jere R., International Commodity 
Agreements:..., op. cit. 
Most of the additional producers' revenues 
noted above come from the developed coun-
tries through these channels. Another possible 
cost is the development of a new entity in 
international primary commodity markets that 
may have significant market power and that 
probably will be less responsive to the devel-
oped countries' interests than to those of the 
developing countries. 
In addition to the possible direct benefits 
due to stabilization of particular primary com-
modity prices, there are at least two further 
major possible indirect macroeconomic bene-
fits for the developed economies: 
First, the more stabile export earnings of 
the developing economies are largely trans-
formed into more stabile effective import de-
mands, thus leading to more stabile demand for 
exports from the developed world, with con-
sequent anticyclical benefits. 
Second, the gains from the reduction of 
inflationary pressures may be significant. 
Imported inflationary shocks from rising com-
modity prices (as in the 1972-1974 commodity 
boom) may provoke macroeconomic policies 
that depress economic activity in the devel-
oped countries. Because of non-competitive 
pricing by industrial firms using commodity 
inputs directly or using their prices as a signal 
and because of macro policy-making, output 
losses attributable to rising commodity prices 
might not be offset by equivalent gains due to 
falling commodity prices. Thus commodity 
price stabilization may lead to a real macro-
economic gain for developed countries. It has 
been calculated by the author that the gain in 
this respect (in terms of prevented unem-
ployment and product loss) brought about by 
the UNCTAD programme operating for a de-
cade could be of the order of a present dis-
counted value of US$ 15 billion for the United 
States alone.25 
In an increasingly interdependent world, 
of course, both of these effects would have 
some secondary benefits for producers by 
stabilizing demands that they face and the 
prices that they must pay for imports from the 
25See Berhman, Jere R., International Commodity 
Agreements:—, op. cit. 
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developed countries. The more important 
aspect of these benefits from the point of view 
of the developing countries, however, is that 
they may make co-operation in the UNCTAD 
programme desirable from the point of view of 
the developed countries. 
5. Alternatives to the UNCTAD programme 
Two international policy alternatives to such 
buffer stock agreements have received consid-
erable attention: the formation of producers' 
cartels by the developing countries, and ex-
panded compensatory finance for shortfalls in 
export revenues of the IMF or STABEX type. 
The OPEC experience raised in many 
people's minds the possibility of the devel-
oping country producers of other commodities 
forming similar cartels of their own to stabilize 
and probably to increase commodity prices. In 
addition to OPEC there have been a number of 
such efforts that have been successful for a 
while in raising primary commodity prices. 
However, an examination of the character-
istic associated with the products involved in 
OPEC and other successful efforts leads to the 
conclusion that developing country efforts to 
cartelize the UNCTAD core commodity mar-
kets are unlikely to be successful. The produ-
cer countries have too little market power, or 
production is diversified among too many 
countries with too diferent cost structures, or 
there are too great substitution possibilities. 
Only with the institutional and financial aid of 
the developed countries is there likely to be 
much possibility of a reorganization of these 
markets along the lines desired by the pro-
ducers. 
Compensatory finance facilities for short-
falls in the developing countries' export pro-
ceeds have recently expanded considerably. 
They present some advantages over inter-
national commodity agreements: they refer to 
all export earnings, not only those from se-
lected products; they do not interfere as direct-
ly with market signals, although elsewhere I 
question whether international commodity 
markets work as well as is often suggested by 
those who are concerned about tampering with 
the markets;26 and they explicitly favour low-
income countries, as may be desirable for 
global income distribution reasons, rather than 
the countries that produce specific com-
modities. 
They also have some relative disadvan-
tages, however: they do not permit the reaping 
of any micro gains by producers and consumers 
from the stabilization of primary product 
prices; they do not generate the potential 
macroeconomic gains from the reduction of 
inflationary pressures that are discussed above, 
and the existing facilities of this type, more-
over, are centered in institutions that are 
characterized by some as being too conserva-
tive and too oriented towards the interests of 
the developed countries. Finally, from the 
point of view of most of Latin America, their 
orientation towards favouring low-income 
countries makes them less relevant (although 
in principle this could be changed). 
The developed countries have empha-
sized the advantages of compensatory finan-
cing and have greatly favoured its expansion 
rather than the establishment of international 
buffer stocks, while the developing countries 
have viewed it as a supplementary measure 
rather than a substitute for the UNCTAD 
programme. Probably underlying both views, 
in addition to the pros and cons outlined here, 
are questions relating to changing the secular 
trends of prices for non-fuel primary products. 
^See Behrman, Jere R., International Commodity 
Agreements:..., op. cit. 
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II 
Changing non-fuel primary commodity price trends 
Over the 1950-1975 period the secular trends in 
the deflated prices of the six UNCTAD core 
commodities of interest to Latin America were 
—3.5% per year for cofle, —2.4% for cocoa, 
—3.8% for cotton, and insignificantly different 
from zero for sugar, copper, and tin.27 Prior to 
UNCTAD IV there was considerable advocacy 
by the developing countries of "indexation" 
(i.e., tying commodity price movements to 
changes in the prices of the goods imported by 
the developing countries). Opposition to 
indexation from the developed countries, how-
ever, was very strong. Consequently, in the 
UNCTAD IV proposal and resolution no men-
tion is made of indexation per se, although a 
number of references hint at such an effort. 
Since the possibility of changes in the secular 
price trends probably underlies both the strong 
advocacy of some developing countries and the 
opposition of some developed countries in 
regard to the UNCTAD programme, a brief 
consideration of the implications of indexation 
(as one special case of so altering the price 
trends) may be useful here. 
In Behrman and Tinakorn2» the effects of 
indexation of all ten UNCTAD core commodi-
ties to the 1963 price levels for a 13-year 
period are explored. The results suggest that 
such an option is not likely to be politically 
feasible for all ten core commodities, nor for the 
six of interest to Latin America. Buffer stock 
interventions are required in every year, and 
for most commodities usually only on one side 
of the market, while the present discounted 
value of the buffer stock activities involved 
would be large: US$ 142 billion for all ten core 
commodities, US$ 70 billion if sugar is ex-
cluded, US$ 93 billion for the core commodi-
ties of interest to Latin America, and US$ 21 
billion for the core commodities of interest to 
Latin America, excluding sugar.2" The amount 
of financial backing required would be of a 
similar order of magnitude. Therefore scep-
ticism seems warranted about the feasibility of 
getting consuming countries to agree to or to 
allow changing the secular trends for long by 
anything like as much as would be required for 
indexation. Since the market characteristics do 
not seem to allow for successful indexation by 
the developing country producers alone, it may 
be concluded that indexation probably is not 
feasible. 
UNCTAD-type buffer stock agreements 
probably could alter the price trends in an 
upward direction by a lesser amount for a 
while, and to do so might result in significant 
gains for the developing producing nations. 
However, it would also lessen the anti-infla-
tionary benefit and increase the cost to the 
consuming developed nations, so that their co-
operation, which seems essential for effective 
international organization of these markets, 
would probably be withdrawn if they per-
ceived that there was a significant effort to alter 
the underlying secular price trends. 
27Ibid. 
^Berhman, Jere R. and Tinakorn, Pranee, "Indexation 
of International Commodity Prices Through International 
Buffer Stock Operations", Journal of Policy Modeling, 1, 
pp. 113-134, 1979. 
29The implications of excluding sugar are indicated 
because of the doubts about the underlying model that are 
mentioned above and that are discussed in Behrman and 
Tinakom, "Evaluating Integrated Schemes...", op. cit. 
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III 
Conclusions 
UNCTAD-type international non-fuel primary 
commodity price stabilization agreements are 
not an easy solution. They require the co-
operation of countries with some competing 
interests, and the possibility that they may alter 
the secular price movements is difficult to 
monitor. Under any particular circumstances 
some developing country producers may lose 
due to their operation, and the global benefits 
may not L*Î particularly progressive. 
Even so, such arrangements do present 
some possibilities for real gains by some Latin 
American producers and by the United States 
and other developed economies. Alternative 
strategies to alter these markets would not 
confer all of the same benefits (although they 
might have other additional advantages). 
Therefore some efforts to explore the possible 
joint advantages of UNCTAD—like program-
mes seem warranted. 
